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Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on how co-operatives and mutual associations are governed. 
Paralleling developments in the private sector, the occurrence of a variety of problems 
in different co-operative societies across Europe, such as mismanagement, financial 
scandals and the failure of democracy, has lead to the quality of co-operative 
governance being questioned (Lees, 1995; Lees and Volkers, 1996). Serious concerns 
have been raised about the democratic legitimacy of boards, because of low levels of 
member participation, and their effectiveness, in particular the ability of lay board 
members to effectively supervise senior managers, ensure probity and protect the 
interests of members and other relevant stakeholders. 
 
Concerns like these have lead to renewed professional and academic interest in 
organisational governance and a growing body of literature and advice. In the non-
profit sector much of this literature has been prescriptive in nature and aimed at 
addressing the perceived shortcomings of governing bodies. However, it has been 
criticised for oversimplifying the problems, underestimating the conflicting demands 
and pressures that board members face, and presenting ‘idealistic or heroic’ solutions 
that are consequently difficult to implement in practice (Herman, 1989; Cornforth, 
1996). These shortcomings point to the need for a greater understanding of the way 
boards work in practice and some of the difficult challenges they face. In previous 
work I have attempted to address this problem by presenting a new framework for 
understanding the governance of public and non-profit organisations in terms of 
multiple theoretical perspectives and a number of key paradoxes or tensions that 
boards face (see Cornforth, 2001, 2002, 2003). In this paper I extend that analysis to 
the governance of co-operatives and mutual associations. The paper addresses two 
related problems.  
 
First, the governance of non-profit organisations, and in particular co-operatives and 
mutual associations, is relatively under theorised in comparison with the governance 
of business corporations, where there is a large literature on corporate governance. In 
particular a variety of competing theories have been proposed to try to understand the 
role of boards in the private sector, including for example agency theory, stewardship 
theory, stakeholder theory, and managerial hegemony theory. A premise of this paper 
is that a number of these theories can be usefully extended to co-operatives. The paper 
briefly reviews each of these theories and discusses how they can be extended and 
applied to throw light on the boards of co-operatives and mutual associations. A 
framework is presented for comparing and contrasting these different theoretical 
perspectives on boards. 
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However, this raises a second related problem. Taken individually the different 
theoretical perspectives are rather one dimensional, only illuminating a particular 
aspect of the board’s role. This has lead to calls among corporate governance 
researchers for a new theoretical or conceptual framework that can help integrate the 
insights of these different perspectives (Hung, 1998: 108-9; Tricker, 2000: 295).Given 
the complexity of governance, the search for a unifying grand theory is unlikely to 
prove fruitful, as has been noted in the field of management and organisational studies 
(e.g. Morgan, 1986). In such circumstances it may be more fruitful to search for a 
meta-theory, which can help to bring together a number of different theoretical 
perspectives in a consistent manner and explain their domains of application 
(Tsoukas, 2000: 27). The paper argues that a multi-paradigm paradox perspective, 
which is informed by the various theoretical perspectives, offers a promising approach 
to providing this new conceptual framework. It argues that taken together these 
multiple theoretical perspectives are helpful in highlighting some of the important 
paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions and that boards face. 
 
Based on this framework the paper outlines some of these key tensions: 
• The tension between board members acting as representatives for particular 
membership groups and ‘experts’ charged with driving the performance of the 
organization forward. 
• The tension between the board roles of driving forward organizational 
performance and ensuring conformance i.e. that the organisation behaves in an 
accountable and prudent manner. 
• The tension between the contrasting board roles of controlling and supporting 
management. 
Each of the these tensions is discussed and the paper draws out some of the 
implications for practice in co-operatives and mutuals. 
 
Finally the paper concludes by considering the implications of taking a paradox 
perspective for future research on co-operative governance. 
 
Competing theoretical perspectives  
 
A variety of competing theories have been proposed to try to understand the role of 
boards in the private sector. Each implies a different model of how boards work and 
who should serve on them. Below each of these theoretical perspectives and 
associated models is briefly examined and how they can be usefully extended to 
throw light on the role of co-operative boards. However, we begin by looking at the 
democratic perspective on boards, which provides the dominant perspective on the 
role and practices of boards in co-operatives and mutual associations. 
A democratic or association perspective – a democratic model 
Democratic government is a central institution in Western societies. Key ideas and 
practices include: open elections on the basis of one person one vote; pluralism i.e. 
that representatives will represent different interests; accountability to the electorate; 
the separation of elected members, who make policy, from the executive, who 
implement policy decisions. Democratic ideas and practices have influenced thinking 
about the governance of many types of organisations. For example many voluntary 
organisations, as well as co-operatives and mutual organisations are established as 
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membership associations, where it is enshrined in the organisation’s constitution that 
the governing body should be elected by and represent the membership in some way.  
 
A democratic perspective on governance suggests that the job of board members is to 
represent the interests of members of the organisation. The role of the board is to 
resolve or choose between the interests of different groups and set the overall policy 
of the organisation, which can then be implemented by staff. Central to this view is 
the idea of a lay or non-professional board, where anyone can put himself or herself 
forward for election as a board member.  Expertise may be desirable but is not a 
central requirement, as it is in some other perspectives on governance, such as the 
partnership model discussed below. 
Agency theory – a compliance model 
Principal-agent theory, or agency theory for short, has been the dominant theory of 
the corporation and corporate governance arrangements (see Keasey et al, 1997: 3-5 
for an overview). It assumes that the owners of an enterprise (the principal) and those 
that manage it (the agent) will have different interests. Hence the owners or 
shareholders of any enterprise face a problem that managers are likely to act in their 
own interests rather than the shareholders. While free markets are seen as the best 
restraint on managerial discretion, agency theory sees corporate governance 
arrangements as another means to ensure that management acts in the best interests of 
shareholders (Keasey et al,1997: 3-5). From this perspective the main function of the 
board is to control managers.  This suggests that a majority of directors of companies 
should be independent of management, and that their primary role is one of ensuring 
managerial compliance – i.e. to monitor and if necessary control the behaviour of 
management to ensure it acts in the shareholders best interests. 
 
Extending agency theory to co-operatives and mutuals suggests that members, as 
owners, are the principles. However, applying agency theory in this context is not 
entirely straightforward and Spear (2003) in this volume discusses in detail some of 
the problems. For our purposes it is worth commenting on two issues. In agency 
theory it is assumed that the main interest of shareholders is to maximise profitability 
and that the market in corporate control, such as pressure from major shareholders or 
the threat of takeover, as well as board monitoring, will help to keep managers aligned 
to this goal. In co-operatives and mutuals the situation is different. First, co-operatives 
are established to serve their members’ interests and hence profitability is a means to 
and end rather than an end in itself. Secondly, the shares of co-operatives and mutuals 
are not traded in a market and hence there are not the same external pressures on 
managers to perform, such as pressure from major shareholders or the threat of 
takeover (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2003). Hence the boards of co-operatives may have 
a diversity of goals, which do not readily translate into traditional measures of 
business performance, and managerial actions will be less constrained by market 
forces. This suggests that for co-operatives and mutuals the boards is the most 
important means that members have of trying to control managerial behaviour, but at 
the same time these boards have to operate in a context where it is likely to be more 
difficult to exert influence. 
Stewardship theory – a partnership model 
Stewardship theory (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) is grounded in a human relations 
perspective (Hung, 1998) and starts from opposite assumptions to agency theory. It 
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assumes that in general managers want to do a good job and will act as effective 
stewards of an organisation’s resources. As a result senior management and 
shareholders (or members, in the case of co-operatives and mutuals) are better seen as 
partners. Hence, the main function of the board is not to ensure managerial 
compliance with shareholders/members interests, but to improve organisational 
performance. The role of the board is primarily strategic, to work with management to 
improve strategy and add value to top decisions. In this context it is not surprising that 
management ideas and practices should be applied to governance. From this 
perspective board members should be selected on the basis of their expertise and 
contacts so that they are in a position to add value to the organisation's decisions; 
boards and managers should receive proper induction and training; they should know 
how to operate effectively as a team etc.  Ideas such as these are common in much of 
the ‘how-to-do-it’ literature on non-profit boards, (see for example Kirkland, 1994). 
 
This perspective is evident in various prescriptive models of governance in both the 
private and non-profit sectors. For example, Pound (1995) suggests what he calls the 
'governed corporation model' of governance for public companies.  In this model the 
board, and major shareholders, are seen as partners of management, and the prime 
function of the board is to add value to the organisation by improving its top decision-
making. The idea of partnership is also strongly present in Block’s (1998) cojoint-
directorship model which he advocates for non-profit boards. In this model the chief 
executive is not regarded as a subordinate of the board but as a colleague, and 
responsibilities are openly discussed and shared. He contrasts this to the ‘traditional’ 
model of the board, where the board is in a hierarchical relationship to the chief 
executive. Davis (1998) advocates a somewhat similar model for co-operatives where 
he argues senior executives should be part of a co-operative’s board and take 
responsibility for its leadership. 
 
This perspective raises a potential problem for co-operatives and mutual associations. 
There is no guarantee that those members elected to the board will have the skills the 
board needs to be effective. This is highlighted by Sivertsen (1996: 35) a senior 
manager in a Norwegian consumer co-operative: 
‘Co-ops tend to be management driven. Whereas board members in major 
private companies are elected within the business environment, board 
members in co-ops are elected among what we would call everyday people. 
Very often solid, earnest people with good judgement, but without the 
necessary background to make strategic decisions in the business world. 
Instead of bringing support and criticism to the Chief Executive they act as 
passive receivers of information.’ 
Resource dependency theory – a co-optation model 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) views organisations as 
interdependent with their environment. Organisations depend crucially for their 
survival on other organisations and actors for resources. As a result they need to find 
ways of managing this dependence and ensuring they get the resources and 
information they need. From this perspective the board is seen as one means of 
reducing uncertainty by creating influential links between organisations through for 
example interlocking directorates. The main functions of the board are to maintain 
good relations with key external stakeholders in order to ensure the flow of resources 
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into and from the organisation, and to help the organisation respond to external 
change. 
 
From this perspective the board is part of both the organisation and its environment. 
The role of the board is one of boundary spanning. Board members are selected for 
the important external links and knowledge they can bring to the organisation, and to 
try to co-opt external influences. The potential for co-operatives to use their boards to 
‘manage’ external dependencies is much more constrained than private companies, as 
board members have to be elected from the co-operatives membership. However, it is 
usually possible for co-operatives to co-opt board members to bring in people with 
additional experience, contacts or skills, although it is unclear how commonly this 
strategy is used. 
Stakeholder theory – a stakeholder model 
Stakeholder theory as applied to governing bodies is based on the premise that 
organisations should be responsible to a range of groups (or stakeholders) in society 
other than just an organisation’s owners or mandators (Hung, 1998: 106). By 
incorporating different stakeholders on boards it is expected that organisations will be 
more likely to respond to broader social interests than the narrow interests of one 
group. This leads to a political role for boards negotiating and resolving the 
potentially conflicting interests of different stakeholder groups in order to determine 
the objectives of the organisation and set policy. 
 
Stakeholder theory has developed mainly in debates over corporate governance in the 
private sector as an alternative to traditional shareholder models, where there has been 
robust debate about its desirability and likely consequences (e.g. Hutton, 1997; 
Tricker, 2000: 295).The principles of stakeholder involvement are less controversial 
in the public and non-profit sectors, and the practice more common, although not 
always discussed in terms of stakeholder theory. Some of the clearest examples in the 
UK are in the field of education where government reforms have specified the broad 
composition of governing bodies. For example, state funded schools are required to 
have governing bodies made up of people appointed or elected from various groups, 
including: parents, the Local Education Authority, teacher governors, and in the case 
of voluntary aided schools, foundation governors representing the church or charity 
supporting the school. In the voluntary sector greater ‘user involvement’ has long be 
espoused as a goal and there have been important moves to involve service users on 
boards of many voluntary organisations, despite the constraints of charity law (Locke 
et al, 2003). 
 
There are constraints in membership associations, such as co-operatives and mutuals, 
on the involvement of different stakeholders on boards, as board members are elected 
from the membership. However, within these constraints there has been concern about 
low member participation and the lack of involvement of certain groups of members, 
such, as women and young people on boards (Itkonen, 1996). In response to these 
concerns the Regional Assembly for Europe of the International Co-operative 
Alliance recommended that co-operatives should seek to revitalise members 
participation and elect more women board members (Lees and Volker, 1996: 46). 
More radically there have been attempts to develop new mutli-stakehoder co-
operatives which seek to incorporate different stakeholders in the membership, such 
as some of the new co-operatives providing social services in Italy (Borzaga and 
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Santuari, 2001). Of course, as noted above, it is also open to co-operatives to co-opt 
board members to bring in different stakeholder perspectives. 
Managerial hegemony theory – a ‘rubber stamp’ model 
Managerial hegemony theory relates back to the thesis of Berle and Means (1932) that 
although shareholders may legally own and control large corporations they no longer 
effectively control them. Control having been ceded to a new professional managerial 
class.  A variety of empirical studies have leant support to this thesis.  Mace (1971) in 
his study of US directors concluded that boards did not get involved in strategy except 
in crises, and that control rested with the president (chief executive) rather than the 
board. Herman (1981) came to similar conclusions but argued that managerial power 
was always in the context of various constraints and the latent power of stakeholders 
such as external board members.  In a more recent study Lorsch and MacIver (1989) 
conclude that although the functioning of boards has improved since Mace’s study, 
their performance still leaves much room for improvement. Like Mace they 
distinguish between boards in normal times and during crises, and conclude that 
during normal times power usually remains with the chief executive. From this 
perspective the board ends up as little more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for management’s 
decisions. Its function is essentially symbolic to give legitimacy to managerial 
actions. 
 
Although this theory was developed in the study of large business corporations, many 
of the processes it describes seem just as relevant to co-operatives and mutual 
organisations: for example the separation of members, who ‘own’ the organisation, 
from those that control it, and the increasing growth and professionalisation of 
management. Indeed it could be argued that the involvement of ordinary members on 
the boards of co-operatives will mean that they are more likely to lack the knowledge 
and expertise to effectively challenge management proposals and decisions. As one 
noted international co-operator, Raija Itkonen (1996 :20), suggests:  
‘Power and decision-making in co-operatives are all too often concentrated at 
the top in too few hands. Co-operative performance has for a long time been 
characterized by a lack of participation and sense of involvement. Statutory 
governing bodies exist to review past performance and to endorse 
management decisions rather than to challenge policies and strategies.’ 
 
The main features of these different perspectives are summarised in Table 1. This 
compares each of these theoretical perspectives in terms of the assumptions they make 
about the interests of different parties involved, who should be board members, and 
the role of the board. Each theory implies a very different model of how boards work. 
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
A paradox perspective - towards a synthesis 
 
Taken individually these different theories are rather one dimensional, and have been 
criticised for only illuminating a particular aspect of the board’s work. This has lead 
to calls for a new conceptual framework that can help integrate the insights of these 
different perspectives (Hung, 1998: 108-9; Tricker, 2000:295). A paradox perspective 
offers a promising approach to providing this new conceptual framework. Taken 
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together these multiple theoretical perspectives are helpful in highlighting some of the 
important ambiguities, tensions and paradoxes that non-profit boards face. 
 
Morgan (1986: 339) in his groundbreaking study of organisations argues that many 
theories and ways of thinking about organisations do not match the complexity and 
sophistication of the realities they face. In order to address this problem he argues that 
it is necessary to take a multi-paradigm or perspective approach in order to 
‘understand and grasp the multiple meanings of situations and to confront and manage 
contradiction and paradox, rather than pretend they do not exist’. At the same time 
there has be a growing recognition that many management problems and issues 
require a move from linear thinking and simple either/or choices to seeing them as 
paradoxes (e.g. Hampden-Turner, 1990; Handy, 1995). Managing paradox means 
embracing and exploring tensions and differences rather than choosing between them. 
As Lewis (2000) charts in her review of the literature the concept of paradox has been 
playing an increasing role in organisation studies. 
A similar critique can be made of attempts to understand organisational governance. 
As Hung (1998: 108) observes in his review of the literature each of the theories of 
governance (discussed above) ‘focus on a small part and no one is able to perceive the 
whole picture of corporate governance’. In a similar vein Tricker (2000: 295) notes 
‘At the moment various theoretical insights cast light on different aspects of play, 
leaving others in the shadow…’. He calls for a new conceptual framework that can 
‘light up the entire stage and all the players’. 
One way of addressing this problem is to take a multi-paradigm perspective and focus 
more explicitly on the paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions involved in governance. 
As Lewis (2000: 772) discusses a multiple perspectives approach can be useful as a 
sensitising device to highlight what are likely to be important paradoxes, by 
contrasting opposing theoretical approaches. So for example contrasting agency 
theory with stewardship theory suggests that boards may experience pressures to both 
control and partner senior management. Next we examine some of the main tensions 
and paradoxes that the contrasting theories of governance suggest that boards are 
likely to face. The list is not meant to be exhaustive. A number of authors have also 
begun to study governance from a paradox perspective. Demb and Neubauer (1992) 
in their study of corporate board identified and examine three paradoxes which stem 
from the legal and structural aspect of the boards setting. Wood (1996) extends this 
approach to the boards of non-profit organisations. Similarly Block (1998) describes 
other common paradoxes facing non-profit boards. Lewis (2003) examine the paradox 
boards face between controlling and supporting management. 
Who governs -the tension between representative and expert boards  
The different theoretical perspectives have different implications for who should serve 
on boards. The opposition is clearest between the stewardship and democratic 
perspectives. Stewardship theory stresses that board members should have expertise 
and experience that can add value to the performance of the organisation. The 
implication is that board members should be selected for their professional expertise 
and skills. In contrast the democratic perspective (and to some extent stakeholder 
theory) stresses that board members are lay representatives, there to serve the 
constituency(s) or stakeholders they represent.  
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This paradox creates a number of tensions at different levels. In the public sector this 
has been most evident at the level of public policy. Since the early 1980’s successive 
Conservative governments in the UK introduced a variety of public sector reforms 
leading to a growth in the number of quangos and public bodies with appointed 
boards. The rationale for these changes was to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public organisations by reducing the political nature of boards and 
bringing in people, particularly from the private sector, who it was assumed had the 
expertise and experience to run them well. This move to non-elected, expert boards in 
many parts of the public sector was heavily criticised for being undemocratic and 
creating a new self-selected elite (Plummer, 1994; Skelcher, 1998). Responding to 
these criticisms recent Labour governments have modified some of these 
arrangements and introduced greater stakeholder involvement, although deep 
concerns over the democratic accountability of many of these boards remains 
(Robinson et al, 2000). These changes have also not been uniform and there are quite 
large differences in governance arrangements between different branches of the public 
sector (see Robinson et al, 2000).  
 
The paradox also raises dilemmas at the organisational level. In membership 
organisations like co-operatives – can ‘lay’ board members also be expected to have 
the necessary expertise to be effective board members. This dilemma is nicely 
highlighted by Wilson (1998: 81-2) drawing on his experience of UK consumer co-
operatives, when he contrasts co-operatives with companies that may set up search 
committees to find non-executive directors with particular skills the board needs: 
‘The democratic process affords no such luxuries. On the one hand, co-
operatives should be strengthened through the presence of lay people bringing 
non-executive experience to the board. At the same time, there can no 
guarantee that the range of skills and experience required will be 
complimentary. Clear gaps may remain in the collective skills required for an 
effective board.’ 
 
The paradox also raises a dilemma for board members.  Is their main role to act as 
representatives of the membership or some particular group of members, or are they 
there to act as experts - advising and supporting management?  
How can membership organisations go about trying to manage this dilemma and 
remain democratic, while at the same time ensuring they have board members with 
the expertise and experience to run an effective board? One way is to improve the 
quality of members putting themselves forward for election. Another way is through 
improving the quality of training and support available to current and potential board 
members. There is some evidence to suggest both strategies are spreading within the 
co-operative movement. Lees and Volker (1996 :45) reporting on a review of 
corporate governance arrangements in European co-operatives recommend that 
training should be offered to all new board members. Sivertson (1996: 35) reports on 
a two-pronged strategy introduced by Norwegian consumer co-operatives. They 
provide training for potential board members and have set a target that ‘one percent of 
our members are to be trained as qualified, competent board members’. In addition 
they have tried to improve the quality of members seeking to become board members 
by introducing election committees in each society to select potential candidates. 
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Another approach is for organisations to use co-options to fill gaps in skills or 
experience among board members. There is some evidence that use of co-options is 
growing among some types of co-operatives and mutuals. Sargent and Nicholls 
(1994) for example trace the growing use of ‘outside non-executive directors’ to 
strengthen the boards of UK agricultural co-operatives. 
Board roles - the tension between conformance and performance  
The different theories of governance put different emphasise on what are the main 
roles of the board. This is most apparent in the opposition between the agency and 
stewardship perspectives. What Garratt (1996) has called the ‘conformance’ versus 
‘performance’ role of boards. Agency theory emphasises the conformance role of the 
board to ensure that the organisation acts in the interests of its ‘owners’ and to be a 
careful steward of their resources. In contrast stewardship theory emphasises the role 
of the board in driving forward organisational performance through adding value to 
the organisation’s strategy and top decisions. 
 
One of the problems for boards is that these contrasting roles require board members 
to behave in very different ways. The conformance role is largely reactive and 
demands attention to detail, careful monitoring and scrutiny of the organisation’s past 
performance and management, and is risk averse.  The performance role is more 
proactive it demands forward vision, an understanding of the organisation and its 
environment and a greater willingness to take risks.  Again, boards face an obvious 
tension concerning how much attention they should pay to these contrasting roles. 
Board members may also experience role conflict in trying to combine such different 
roles. 
 
The way organisations’ experience this tension is also shaped by wider contextual 
factors. In the public sector the conflicting pressures arising from government policy 
often heighten this paradox. As Greer et al (2003) note on the one hand public 
organisations are expected by government to be innovative and entrepreneurial. On 
the other hand they are often subject to centrally imposed initiatives, performance 
targets and close monitoring and audit, which effectively constrain their opportunities 
for strategic choice. At the same time they are often exposed to a good deal of bad 
publicity if things do go wrong. Cornforth and Edwards (1999), illustrate this 
dilemma using the case studies of a school and a college in the UK where the boards 
felt that the number of Government initiatives and requirements imposed on them 
severely constrained both the time they could devote to strategic issues and their 
freedom of action. Somewhat similar concerns have been raised with regard to the 
private sector, where it has been argued that many of the corporate governance 
reforms in both the UK and USA have emphasised the conformance role of boards at 
the expense of their role in improving business performance (Pound, 1995). 
 
How can boards manage this tension between their conformance and performance 
roles, so that issues of long term or strategic importance do not get squeezed off the 
board’s agenda, while at the same time the boards’ capacity for independent scrutiny 
is not compromised? Cornforth and Edwards (1998, 1999) suggest a number of 
important factors that enabled some of the non-profit boards they studied to have 
greater involvement in strategy making, a key aspect of the performance role, without 
compromising their conformance role. The attitudes and experience of board 
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members themselves was important, which in turn could be shaped by board selection 
processes, board training and by the attitudes of managers to their boards. Also 
important were board processes. It was necessary to manage board agendas so that 
important, longer-term issues were given priority. In some organisations long, 
detailed agendas meant that a process of operational drift occurred, where boards 
became bogged down in operational detail leaving insufficient time for longer-term 
strategic issues. Some of the more successful organisations also regularly set aside 
special meetings where routine board matters were set aside to focus on strategy.  
Similarly, Garratt (1996) advocates a board cycle where different aspects of the board 
role are to some degree separated out over time in an annual cycle of board meetings. 
This was also an important means of managing the tension that can arise from 
carrying out very different roles at the same time. 
Relationships with management - the tension between controlling and supporting 
 
The relationship between boards and management is viewed very differently within 
the contrasting theoretical perspectives. The agency, democratic and stewardship 
perspectives stress the importance of the board monitoring and controlling the work of 
managers (the executive).  In contrast stewardship theory stresses the role of the board 
as a partner to management, working in collaboration to improve top management 
decision-making. 
 
This particular governance paradox is examined in detail by Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis (2003). They suggest that organisations may experience a cycle of decline if 
boards put too much emphasis or either control or collaboration. They suggest that too 
much stress on collaboration and partnership can lead to groupthink where 
management ideas and strategies are not adequately scrutinised and challenged. This 
can lead to strategic persistence in good times and a cycle of organisational decline as 
performance deteriorates. Conversely, too much emphasis on control can lead to a 
separation of responsibilities between the board and management, and defensive 
attitudes where management seek to justify their strategies and actions. Increasing 
levels of distrust may reinforce defensive attitudes hampering communication and 
mutual learning, which may again may lead to a cycle of decline. 
 
A paradox perspective suggests that a simple dichotomy between boards controlling 
or partnering management is too simplistic. Different forms of behaviour will be 
appropriate at different times in the relationship. In a similar vein Kramer (1985) 
suggests that the board relationship with management is constantly shifting between 
consensus, difference and ‘dissensus’ depending on the issues being faced and the 
circumstances. The question is more one of balance and how to manage the inevitable 
tensions that can arise in such complex relationships. 
 
How can the complex and paradoxical relationship between boards and senior 
managers and the resulting tensions best be managed? As Mole (2003) has pointed 
out tension and conflict seem most likely to occur when boards and senior managers 
have different expectations of their respective roles. The complex and interdependent 
nature of the roles offers plenty of scope for different interpretations. One way of 
trying to establish a productive working relationship is through explicit discussion and 
negotiation over roles and responsibilities. Cornforth and Edwards (1998) suggest that 
an important determinant of effective governance was that boards regularly review 
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their relationship with management and how they were working together. Harris 
(1993), drawing on action research in small voluntary organisations, goes further and 
suggests the value of a technique called Total Activities Analysis where boards and 
staff systematically review the organisations main activities and examine who should 
play what part in carrying them out. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper examined how existing theories of corporate governance can be extended 
to help understand the governance of co-operatives and mutual organisations, but 
argued that by themselves each theory is too one-dimensional only highlighting a 
particular aspect of the board’s role. Empirical research on non-profit boards suggests 
governance is a complex, inherently difficult and problematic activity. As a number of 
governance scholars have recently noted we need to find new ways of thinking about 
governance that move beyond narrow theoretical frameworks. The paper argued that a 
paradox perspective, which draws upon multiple theoretical perspectives, is one 
promising approach, which helps to explain some of the difficult tensions and 
ambiguities that boards’ face. 
 
Another criticism that can be levelled at much of the theorising about boards (both 
descriptive and prescriptive) is it generic nature. Often little or no account is taken of 
contextual factors, such as organisational size or changes in public policy, that may 
influence or shape board characteristics or how they work. This is not something that 
is unique to the study of boards; similar criticisms have been levelled at much recent 
research in the field of organisational behaviour (Mowday and Sutton, 1993; 
Rousseau and Fried, 2001). An important priority for future research on the 
governance of co-operatives and mutuals, and indeed organisations across all sectors, 
is more studies that examine how contextual factors influence what boards do. For 
instance, we need more comparative studies that systematically compare the 
governance of organisations in different sectors and fields of activity and examine 
how these differences shape board composition, roles and relationships. An example 
here is the work of Otto (2003) who examined the role of chairs of governing bodies 
and senior managers in voluntary, statutory and private sector organisations. Equally 
we need to better understand examine how organisational factors, such as 
organisational size influence the nature of what boards do, (see for example 
Rochester, 2003). 
 
The idea of paradox and tension also sensitise us to the dynamic nature of 
governance. Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) proposed that boards and managers 
may get trapped into defensive cycles of behaviour, which lead to processes of 
organisational decline. They also consider various ways these problems might be 
addressed to avoid defensive spirals. In order to examine these problems and 
processes we need more in depth and longitudinal case studies, which examine the 
dynamics of relationship between boards and managers and how they attempt to 
tackle the problems and dilemmas they face.  
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THEORY INTERESTS BOARD 
MEMBERS 
BOARD ROLE MODEL 
Agency theory ‘Owners/members’ 
and 
managers have 
different interests 
‘Owner/members’ 
representatives 
Conformance: 
- safeguard ‘owners’ 
interests 
- oversee management 
- check compliance 
Compliance 
 model 
Stewardship 
theory 
‘Owners/members’ 
and managers share 
interests 
‘Experts’ Improve performance: 
- add value to top 
decisions/strategy 
- partner/support 
management 
Partnership 
model 
Democratic 
perspective 
Members/the 
public contain 
different interests 
 ‘Lay/member’ 
representatives 
Political: 
- represent member 
interests 
- make policy 
- control executive 
 
Democratic 
model 
 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Stakeholders have 
different interests 
Stakeholder 
representatives 
Political: 
-balancing stakeholder 
needs 
- make policy 
- control management 
Stakeholder 
model 
Resource 
dependency 
theory 
Stakeholders and 
organisation have 
different interests 
Chosen for 
influence with key 
stakeholders 
Boundary spanning: 
- secure resources 
- stakeholder relations 
- external perspective 
Co-optation 
model 
 
Managerial 
hegemony 
theory 
‘Owners/members’ 
and managers have 
different interests 
Owners/members’ 
representatives 
Symbolic: 
- ratify decisions 
- give legitimacy 
(managers have real 
power) 
‘Rubber 
stamp’ 
model 
 
 
Table 1: A Comparison of Theoretical Perspectives on Organisational Governance 
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